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California Supreme Court Expands the Informed 
Consent Doctrine; Physicians Have a Duty to 
Obtain an Informed Refusal: Truman u. Thomas 
The doctrine of informed consent requires that a physician 
inform a patient of any significant dangers or risks connected 
with a proposed treatment before obtaining the patient's con- 
sent to the treatment? Otherwise, the physician may be liable in 
tort under a theory of battery' or negligence3 for harm resulting 
1. See generally Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 
U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); 
Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960). See also Plante, An Analysis of 
"Informed Consent," 36 FORDHAM L.REV. 639 (1968); Riga, Informed Consent, 10 LIN- 
COLN L. REV. 159 (1977); Seidelson, Medical Malpractice: Informed Consent Cases in 
"Full Disclosure" Jurisdictions, 14 Dug. L. REV. 309 (1976); Waltz & Scheuneman, In- 
formed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 628 (1970); Comment, Informed Consent 
in Medical Malpractice, 55 C h a .  L. REV. 1396 (1967). 
2. The theory of battery has been used to impose liability where the physician per- 
forms treatment without obtaining an informed consent to the treatment. See Wall v. 
Brim, 138 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 857 (1945) (failure to inform of 
risks inherent in removal of cyst); Belcher v. Carter, 13 Ohio App. 2d 113, 234 N.E.2d 
311 (1967) (failure to warn of radiation burns); Gray v. Grunnagle, 423 Pa. 144, 223 A.2d 
663 (1966), appeal denied, 425 Pa. 403, 228 A.2d 735 (1967) (failure to warn patient of 
risk of paralysis). However, the more logical application of the battery theory is in those 
situations where the physician performs treatment for which the patient has not con- 
sented or where the treatment as administered deviates from the type of treatment for 
which consent was given. See Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906) (patient 
consented to an operation on her womb; surgery exceeded her consent when physician 
removed her ovaries and uterus); Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905), 
reu9d on other grounds, 98 Minn. 494,108 N.W. 818 (1906) (physician obtained patient's 
consent to an operation on the right ear; surgery performed on patient's left ear); 
Schloendorff v. Society of N. Y. Hwp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914) (tumor surgi- 
cally removed without patient's consent). 
3. See Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393,350 P.2d 1093 (1960). Natanson was one of 
the first decisions to indicate that a physician's liability for failure to inform the patient 
of the risks accompanying the proposed treatment should be based on negligence. The 
Natanson court observed that "what appears to distinguish the case of the unauthorized 
surgery or treatment from traditional assault and battery cases is the fact that in almost 
all of the cases the physician is acting in relatively good faith for the benefit of the 
patient." Id. at  401-02, 350 P.2d at  1100. 
The trend today is to apply the law of negligence where the consent was based on 
insdlicient information rather than lack of consent. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 
772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 
P.2d 1,104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); Di Filippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961); 
Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 
676 (1972). 
For a general discussion of the battery and negligence theories, see W. PROSSER, 
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from an undisclosed risk. The Supreme Court of California in 
Truman v. Thomas4 held that the doctrine of informed consent 
also requires that a physician inform a patient who refuses to 
submit to a diagnostic test of the risks the patient is assuming. 
In Truman the patient refused to submit to her physician's rec- 
ommended diagnostic test6 and died of the disease the diagnos- 
tic test probably would have detected. In holding that a physi- 
cian could be liable in a wrongful death action, the court 
reasoned that a decision to refuse to submit to a diagnostic test 
must be based on a knowledge of the risks inherent in not hav- 
ing the test performed? 
Rena Truman died of cervical cancer in July, 1970, at the 
age of thirty. Respondent, Dr. Claude R. Thomas, a general 
practitioner, acted as primary physician for Mrs. Truman from 
1963 to l96W In 1969, Mrs. Truman consulted a urologist about 
a urinary infection and was referred to a gyne~ologist.~ The gyn- 
ecologist "discovered that Mrs. Truman's cervix had been 
largely replaced by a cancerous tumor.'" Dr. Thomas had not 
performed a Pap smear test on Mrs. Truman during the six 
years he had acted as her physician, but he testified that "on at 
least two occasions when he performed pelvic examinations of 
Mrs. Truman she refused him permission to perform the test, 
stating that she could not afford the cost."1° Expert witnesses 
- -- 
HANDBOOK F THE LAW OF TORTS $ 32, at  165-66 (4th ed. 1971); Karlson & Erwin, Medi- 
cal Malpractice: Informed Consent to the Locality Rule, 12 IND. L. REV. 653 (1979); 
Riskin, Informed Consent: Looking for the Action, 1975 U .  IU. L.F. 580, Note, Duty of 
Doctor to Inform Patient of Risks of Treatment: Battery or Negligence?, 34 S.  CAL. L. 
REV. 217 (1961). 
4. 27 Cal. 3d 285, 611 P.2d 902, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1980). 
5. Dr. Thomas recommended to Mrs. Truman that she undergo a Pap smear test. 
Id. at  289, 611 P.2d at  904, 165 Cal. Rptr. a t  310. 
A Pap smear test involves the examination of body secretions from the cervix which 
may be used to detect cervical cancer in women. T. STEDMAN, STEDMAN'S ~WEDICAL DIC- 
TIONARY 1610 (2d ed. 1966). 
6. 27 Cal. 3d at  292, 611 P.2d a t  906, 165 Cal. Rptr. a t  312. 
7. Id. at  288, 611 P.2d at  904, 165 Cal. Rptr. at  310. 
8. Id. The urologist examined Mrs. Truman in April 1969; in May, after explaining 
to her the seriousness of her symptoms, he suggested she see a gynecologist. The urolo- 
gist fhally made the appointment with the gynecologist in October after Mrs. Truman 
had neglected to do so. Truman v. Thomas, 93 Cal. App. 3d 304, 155 Cal. Rptr. 752, 754 
(1979) (Truman v. Thomas has been deleted from 93 Cal. App. 3d and hereinafter will be 
cited without reference to 93 Cal. App. 3d). 
9. 27 Cal. 3d at  289, 611 P.2d at  904, 165 Cal. Rptr. at  310. At this advanced stage 
the cancer could not be surgically removed and was unsuc~es8fully treated. Id. 
10. Id. During Mrs. Truman's first visit to Dr. Thomas she reported having had a 
Pap smear test within the past year. Truman v. Thomas, 155 Cal. Rptr. 752,753 (1979). 
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testified that a Pap smear test probably would have detected the 
cancer at a stage when it could have been curable if treated." 
Following Mrs. Truman's death, her children brought a 
wrongful death malpractice action against Dr. Thomas. The 
Superior Court of Butte County, California, entered judgment in 
favor of the defendant-physician.12 The minor children ap- 
pealed,lS arguing that the trial court erred in refusing three re- 
quested jury instructions: one dealing with strict liability" and 
two dealing with the issue of informed consent? A split court of 
Dr. Thomas testified at trial. 
As I said many times with Rena, when we were doing pelvics, I would say, 
"Rena, you should have a pap smear now," and for various reasons she put it 
off. . . . [Wle already had the equipment there and [were] ready to do it and 
we always tried to tell girls to have one every year. 
Id. 
The charge at that time for a Pap smear test was six dollars. Mrs. Truman promised 
to come in later for a complete examination including a Pap smear test. Id. at 754. 
11. 27 Cal. 3d at 289, 611 P.2d at  904, 165 Cal. Rptr. at  310. 
12. Id. at 285, 611 P.2d at 902, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 308. 
13. Truman v. Thomas, 155 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1979). 
14. The plaintiffs requested that the jury be instructed: 
[A]s a matter of law . . . a physician who fails to perform a Pap smear test on 
a female patient over the age of 23 and to whom the patient has entrusted her 
general physical care is liable for injury or death proximately caused by the 
failure to perform the test. 
Id. at 755. The plaintiffs based this argument on the Washington Supreme Court deci- 
sion in Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974), which held that the 
defendant ophthalmologist was negligent for failing to perform a glaucoma test on the 
patient. The case has been severely criticized and limited to its facts. See Swanson v. 
Brigham, 18 Wash. App. 647, 571 P.2d 217 (1977); Meeks v. Marx, 15 Wash. App. 571, 
550 P.2d 1158 (1976). See also Pearson, The Role of Custom in Medical Malpractice 
Cases, 51 IND. L.J. 528 (1976). The California Court of Appeal rejected the Helling hold- 
ing in Barton v. Owen, 71 Cal. App. 3d 484, 498, 139 Cal. Rptr. 494, 502 (1977). 
The court of appeal rejected the jury instruction, reasoning that it would give no 
direction to the medical profession as to a standard of care. 155 Cal. Rptr. at 756. 
15. The first requested instruction on informed consent was taken from the CALI- 
PORNU JURY INSTRUCTIONS and states in part 
It is the duty of a physician or surgeon to disclose to his patient all rele- 
vant information to enable the patient to make an informed decision regarding 
the proposed operation or treatment. 
There is no duty to discuss minor risks inherent in common procedures, 
when such procedures very seldom result in serious ill effects. 
However, when a procedure inherently involves a known risk of death or 
serious bodily harm, it is the physician's or surgeon's duty to disclose to his 
patient the possibility of such outcome and to explain in lay terms the compli- 
cations that might possibly occur. The physician or surgeon must also disclose 
such additional information as a skilled practitioner of good standing would 
provide under the same or similar circumstances. 
. . . . 
Notwithstanding the patient's consent to a proposed treatment or opera- 
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appeal upheld the trial court's refusal of all three instructions, 
holding that unless a patient requests information, a physician is 
not under a duty to inform a patient of the dangers of failure to 
submit to a recommended diagnostic test? 
In a four to three decision, the Supreme Court of California 
reversed the court of appeal, holding that it was prejudicial error 
to have refused one of the requested jury instructions on in- 
formed consent." The majority held that "if a patient indicates 
that he or she is going to decline the risk-free test or treatment, 
then the doctor has the additional duty of advising of all mate- 
rial risks of which a reasonable person would want to be in- 
formed before deciding not to undergo the procedure."18 The 
dissent, in contrast, strongly criticized the majority for imposing 
on doctors the burden of having to explain diagnostic tests to 
tion, failure of the physician or surgeon to inform the patient as stated in this 
instruction before obtaining such consent is negligence and renders the physi- 
cian or surgeon subject to liability for any injury [proximately] [legally] result- 
ing from the [treatment] [operation] if a reasonably prudent person in the pa- 
tient's position would not have consented to the [treatment] [operation] if he 
had been adequately informed of all the significant perils. 
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, C LIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 6.11 (5th ed. Supp. 
1975) (sometimes referred to as Book of Approved Jury Instructions; hereinafter referred 
. to as BAJI). 
The BAJI instruction presupposed that the patient had consented to treatment and, 
therefore, was properly rejected because Mrs. Truman refused the test rather than con- 
sented to it. 155 Cal. Rptr. at 756. 
The second requested jury instruction on informed consent was a special instruction 
paraphrasing the BAJI No. 6.11. 
It is the duty of a physician to disclose to his patient all relevant informa- 
tion to enable the patient to make an informed decision regarding the submis- 
sion to or refusal to take a diagnostic test. 
Failure of the physician to disclose to his patient all relevant information 
including the risks to the patient if the test is refused renders the physician 
liable for any injury legally resulting from the patient's refusal to take the test, 
if a reasonable prudent person in the patient's position would not have refused 
the test if she had been adequately informed of all the significant perils. 
155 Cal. Rptr. at 757. This instruction was rejected. The court of appeal felt bound by 
the fact that no California court had ever recognized a doctrine of informed refusal. Id. 
16. Id. at 760. The dissenting judge disagreed with this analysis: "When a doctor has 
advised a patient to undergo testing and a patient declines to do so, the doctor has an 
afErmative duty to insure that the patient's refusal is informed by all material facts per- 
tinent to the decision." Id. at 763 (Karlton, J., dissenting). 
17. 27 Cal. 3d 285, 611 P.2d 902, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308. 
18. Id. at 292, 611 P.2d at 906, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 312. The court rejected Dr. 
Thomas' argument that the doctrine of informed consent did not apply to him because 
he had obtained no consent to treatment from Mrs. Truman and that patients who reject 
their physicians' advice should be responsible for inquiring further as to the conse- 
quences of their decisions. Id. 
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healthy persons.'@ 
In Truman the Supreme Court of California, without ac- 
knowledging it as such, actually introduced a new doctrine that 
might be termed informed refusal. The court held that Dr. 
Thomas could be found liable under the auspices of the in- 
formed consent doctrine for failing to inform Mrs. Truman that 
her refusal to submit to a Pap smear test could result in fatal 
consequences. The court failed to recognize, however, that the 
Truman facts could not support a determination of liability 
under the informed consent doctrine. Before other courts rely on 
Truman to expand physician liability by adopting a new doc- 
trine of informed refusal, they should carefully analyze the doc- 
trinal aberrations and potentially adverse practical ramifications 
of this decision. 
The following analysis will demonstrate that the doctrine of 
informed consent should not be broadened to include liability 
for a physician's failure to inform a patient of the inherent and 
obvious risks of refusing to submit to a recommended and com- 
mon, risk-free diagnostic test. However, under certain limited 
circumstances a physician should be liable for failure to make 
information available that will enable the patient to make an 
informed decision whether to consent to or refuse the test or 
treatment. 
Although the idea that a physician must obtain a patient's 
consent to treatment is not new to the courts,aO it was not until 
the early 1950's that liability was imposed on a physician for 
failing to inform a patient of the risks inherent in treatment 
prior to obtaining consent.a1 The doctrine of informed consent 
has since become universally accepted in medical jurispru- 
dence." However, this doctrine has been refined over the past 
19. Id. at 297, 611 P.2d at 909, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 315 (Clark, J., dissenting). Justice 
Clark argued that "carried to its logical end, the majority decision requires physicians to 
explain to patients who have not had a recent general examination the intricacies of 
chest examinations, blood analyses, X-ray examinations . . . and innumerable other pro- 
cedures." Id. at 298, 611 P.2d at 910, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 316. 
20. See Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905), reu'd on other 
grounds, 98 Minn. 494,108 N.W. 818 (1906); Schloendofi v. Society of N. Y. Hosp., 211 
N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914). 
21. One of the earliest cases to examine the informed consent theory was Salgo v. 
Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957). 
See also Di Filippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961); Natanson v. Kline, 186 
Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960); Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965). 
22. See Seidelson, Medical Malpractice: Informed Consent Cases in "Full Disclo- 
sure" Jurisdictions, 14 Dug. L. REV. 309, 309 n.1, 310 n.2 (1976). 
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thirty years to impose liability only in a narrowly defined situa- 
tion: where the patient consents to treatment and an undis- 
closed risk of that treatment causes injury to the patient? 
In Truman the California Supreme Court imposed liability 
under the theory of informed consent in a situation beyond what 
had previously been the scope of the doctrine. Truman is the 
first decision to impose liability on a physician for an act of 
omission where there had been no bodily intrusion; it was also 
the first decision to impose liability on a physician under the 
doctrine of informed consent where there had been neither con- 
sent nor treatment.24 
In imposing this new liability, the court relied heavily on 
Cobbs v. Grant," a recent leading case examining informed con- 
23. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 ~ . 2 h  772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 
(1972) (patient consented to laminectomy without being informed of possibility of paral- 
ysis); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972) (patient con- 
sented to surgery without being informed of risks of subsequent complications); Natan- 
son v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960) (patient suffered radiation burns after 
consenting to radiation therapy; insufficient disclosure of risks); Aiken v. Clary, 396 
S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965) (patient consented to insulin shock therapy without being in- 
formed of risks of coma and brain damage). 
24. Professor Riga outlines the elements of a cause of action under the informed 
consent doctrine: 
1. Physician recommended a certain treatment; 
2. Plaintiff consented to the treatment; 
3. Physician failed to disclose a risk of the treatment that he knew would 
have been material to the patient's decision; 
4. Physician performed the treatment; 
5. Patient was injured as a result of an undisclosed risk. 
Riga, supra note 1. 
Noticeably absent from Truman are two of those elements: the plaintiffs consent to 
treatment and performance of the treatment by the physician. A cause of action should 
not lie when one or more elements are missing. "Thus, the autonomy and privacy of the 
human person is [sic] informed consent has two parts: first, that s ac i en t  information is 
disclosed to comprehend the procedure and its effects upon him, and second, that the 
patient actually agrees to the procedure to be employed." Id. at 177 (emphasis added). 
Justice Clark, dissenting in Truman, stated: "Where no intrusion takes place, no need 
for consent-effective or otherwise-arises." 27 Cal. 3d at 300, 611 P.2d at 911, 165 Cal. 
Rptr. at  317 (Clark, J., dissenting). Footnote 1 in Justice Clark's dissenting opinion elab- 
orates further: 
[The] authority relied on by the majority . . . is concerned with whether con- 
sent to therapy was informed and therefore effective. The cases involved situa- 
tions where there has been an intrusion to the body autonomy and, it is 
claimed the intrusion was consensual. Thus, the question of informed consent 
is crucial. None involves the situation where the patient has refused the intru- 
sion and thus consent is immaterial. 
Id. at  300 n.1, 611 P.2d at 911 n.1, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 317 n.1. 
25. 8 Cal. 3d 229,502 P.2d 1,104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972). For a discussion of Cobbs v. 
Grant, see Comment, New Trends in Informed Colisent, 54 NEB. L. REV. 66, 80-83 
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sent in California. Truman is factually distinguishable from 
Cobbs. In Cobbs the patient attempted to impose liability upon 
the physician for failing to inform him of the risks inherent in 
surgery to relieve a duodenal ulcer when an undisclosed risk of 
the surgery de~eloped.'~ The facts in Truman were significantly 
different in that the patient there refused treatment (the diag- 
nostic test), which necessarily means that the patient's illness 
was not a result of treatment." Cobbs held that a physician has 
a "duty of reasonable disclosure of the available choices with re- 
spect to proposed therapy and of the dangers inherently and po- 
tentially involved in each."a8 Truman expanded a physician's 
duty to a patient to include informing a patient of the dangers 
of refusing tests? This extension of Cobbs would be justified if 
Dr. Thomas had obtained Mrs. Truman's consent to submit to a 
risky diagnostic test without first disclosing those risks. But that 
situation did not exist. The test was risk-free and was refused by 
Mrs. Truman.80 
Had the Supreme Court of California analyzed Truman in 
the same manner that it analyzed Cobbs, the court would likely 
have concluded that important theoretical differences preclude 
application of the informed consent doctrine to Truman. The 
Cobbs court postulated four basic characteristics that typify the 
physician-patient relationship: (1) A patient is generally un- 
learned in the medical sciences; (2) An adult has the right to 
decide whether or not to submit to a medical treatment; (3) A 
patient's consent to treatment, to be effective, must be an in- 
formed consent; and (4) A patient depends on his physician for 
information in making his deci~ion.~~ Applying these characteris- 
tics to the Thomas-Truman relationship reveals that the Tru- 
man case is fundamentally different from the Cobbs case. 
First, a woman in Mrs. Truman's position would not need to 
(1975); 61 CALIF. L. REV. 634 (1973). 
26. 8 Cal. 3d at 234-35, 502 P.2d at 4-5, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 508-09. The California 
Supreme Court held that there was insutEcient evidence to establish that the physician 
negligently performed the surgery and reversed and remanded on the issue of informed 
consent. Id. at 238-39,502 P.2d at  7,104 Cal. Rptr. at 510-11. To assist the trial court in 
deciding the case the supreme court analyzed a physician's duty to obtain the patient's 
informed consent prior to treatment. Id. at 244-45,502 P.2d at 11,104 Cal. Rptr. at 515. 
27. 27 Cal. 3d at 292,611 P.2d at 906, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 312. 
28. 8 Cal. 3d at 243, 502 P.2d at  10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514. 
29. 27 Cal. 3d at 292,611 P.2d at  906, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 312. * 
30. Id. 
31. 8 Cal. 3d at 242, 502 P.2d at  9, 104 Cal. Rptr. at  513. 
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be learned in medical science to realize that a Pap smear test 
was a common diagnostic test routinely administered by physi- 
cians to detect cancer and that death can result by allowing can- 
cer to develop undetected. Secondly, Dr. Thomas obviously rec- 
ognized and respected Mrs. Truman's right to decide whether or 
not to submit to a medical treatment. Thirdly, it does not neces- 
sarily follow that a patient's refusal of a diagnostic test must be 
an informed refusal to be effective. Finally, the duty imposed by 
Cobbs was directed toward protecting a patient from "abjectly" 
consenting to treatment without adequate knowledge of the 
risks invo l~ed .~~  Thus, this protection is not necessary where a 
patient refuses a physician's advice and consequently is not sub- 
jected to the treatment and resulting risks. 
In summary, the Truman case does not present the fact sit- 
uation to which informed consent theory has been previously ap- 
plied. Furthermore, the basic postulates providing policy sup- 
port for informed consent, as set forth in Cobbs, do not apply to 
the Truman case. However, even if it is agreed that the doctrine 
of informed consent does not provide the proper theoretical ba- 
sis for resolution of this case, Truman still raises the potentially 
controversial question of whether physicians should be liable for 
failing to inform patients of the risks of refusing treatment or 
diagnostic tests. 
The correct analytical approach to this question would be to 
consider the doctrine of informed refusal under traditional med- 
ical malpractice negligence theories. This approach, which fo- 
cuses on the physician's duty of care to the patient and on the 
medical standard, suggests that in certain circumstances a phy- 
sician should be found liable for failing to inform a patient of 
risks inherent in refusing medical tests, but that in factual situa- 
tions similar to Truman the physician should not be found 
liable. 
The basic elements of a cause of action for medical malprac- 
tice negligence are (1) a duty owing to the plaintiff (patient), (2) 
a breach of that duty by the defendant (physician), (3) an injury 
to the plaintiff, and (4) ~ausa t ion .~~  Accordingly, the initial step 
32. 155 Cal. Rptr. at 757. 
33. "A prima facie case of medical malpractice must normally consist of evidence 
which establishes the applicable standard of care, demonstrates that this standard has 
been-violated, and develops a causal relationship between the violation and the harm 
complained of." Kosberg v. Washington Hosp. Center, Inc., 394 F.2d 947,949 (D.C. Cir. 
1968). See also W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at Q 30. 
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in establishing a doctrine of informed refusal is to expand the 
physician's duty to include an obligation to inform the patient of 
risks inherent in refusing to submit to recommended medical 
treatment or diagnostic tests.u This duty did not exist in Cali- 
fornia before Truman and logically cannot be imposed under the 
doctrine of informed consent. Therefore, if the duty is to be ex- 
panded, the court should fashion a new and distinct doctrine of 
informed refusal. 
The second and third elements of a cause of action based on 
informed refusal would not differ from other forms of malprac- 
tice liability and are basically questions of proof. However, an 
informed refusal theory presents some difficulties that have been 
characterized as "causation" issues.s6 Theoretically, the plain- 
tiffs in Truman would have the burden to prove (1) that Mrs. 
Truman would not have refused the test had she been informed 
of the risks," (2) that the Pap smear test would have positively 
detected the presence of cervical cancer,S7 and (3) that the can- 
cer once detected would have responded to treatment and would 
34. A central issue in Truman was whether Dr. Thomas had a duty to inform Mrs. 
Truman of the potentially fatal consequences of her decision not to submit to a Pap 
smear test. The court found that this duty did exist under the Cobbs holding, reasoning 
that a physician has a duty to make all material information available to a patient. 27 
Cal. 3d at 292, 611 P.2d at 906, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 312. 
35. Cf. Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk v. Proximate Cause and the Rational Allo- 
cation of Functions Between Judge and Jury, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 1 (suggests that a 
duty-risk analysis is more rational and preferred over the traditional proximate cause 
analysis). 
36. The requested jury instruction in Truman states that breach of the duty renders 
the physician liable for any " 'legally resulting [injury] . . . if a reasonably prudent per- 
son in the patient's position would not have refused the test if she had been adequately 
informed of all the significant perils.' " 27 Cal. 3d at 294,611 P.2d at 907, 165 Cal. Rptr. 
at 313 (quoting BAJI, supra note 15, No. 6.11). "Legally resulting" was defined as, "[A] 
'proximate cause of an injury . . . which, in natural and continuous sequence, produces 
the injury, and without which the injury would not have occurred.' " Id. (quoting BAJI, 
supra note 15, No. 3.75). Causation in informed consent cases usually is established by 
showing that the plaintiff would not have consented to treatment had the risks been 
disclosed. 
37. Whether the Pap smear test is effective in detecting cervical cancer is currently 
in dispute. A recent medical journal article stated, "The Pap smear test also fails to 
detect the presence of cervical cancer in up to 48 percent of women under 50." Rylander, 
Negative Smears in Women Developing Invasive Cervical Cancer, 56 ACTA. OBSTET. 
GYNECOL. SCAND. 115, 116 (1977), quoted in Brief of Amicus Curiae Association of De- 
fense Counsel in Support of Defendant and Respondent at 12. "A few critics go so far as 
to say that the test [Pap smear] does not save lives at all . . . . But the main criticism, 
. . . is that the costs of annual screening for cervical cancer are too high in comparison to 
the rather small number of lives saved." Mart, The Annual Pap Smear: An Idea Whose 
Time Has Gone?, 205 SCIENCE 177 (1979). 
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have been Such a hnothetical chain of "causation" 
presents difficult analytical problems.89 Nevertheless, similar 
"causation" problems exist in informed consent cases and have 
been overcome by courts that have imposed a proximate causa- 
tion standard.'O 
38. The American Cancer Society claims: "If every woman had a Pap smear test 
with her regular health checkup, there would be virtually no deaths from cervical cancer. 
The overall five-year survival rate for cancer of the cervix is about 60 percent." AMERI- 
CAN CANCER SOCIETY, INC., FACTS & FIGURES 1980 17 (1979). 
39. See generally Thode, The Indefensible Use of the Hypothetical Case to Deter- 
mine Cause in Fact, 46 TEX. L. REV. 423 (1968). 
40. In informed consent cases the plaintiff must show that the injury was caused by 
a materialization of risks about which he should have been informed and that a reasona- 
ble person in the patient's position would have declined therapy had he been adequately 
informed. This represents the objective test of causation. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 
F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). A minority of jurisdictions follow 
a subjective standard, requiring proof that the particular patient would not have under- 
gone the treatment had the risks been disclosed. See generally Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 
Ariz. App. 358, 409 P.2d 74 (1965), modified, 2 Ariz. App. 607, 411 P.2d 45 (1966); Di 
Filippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 
350 P.2d 1093 (1960); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972). 
Problems arise under the subjective standard when the patient has died or is too ill 
to testify. In Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965), a case similar to Truman in 
that the patient died before trial, the court rejected the defendant's argument that the 
jury could not resolve the causation issue without the patient's testimony. The court 
stated: 
The matter of causation still must be submitted to the jury. . . . [A] jury 
could find from all the facts and circumstances in a particular case that had 
plaintiff been properly informed he would not have consented to the treat- 
ment, and this is so even though plaintiff does not specifically so testify. 
Id. at 676. 
Both the subjective and objective tests are an application of the "but for" rule, 
which comes as close to being the essence of the proximate cause theory of causation as 
any theory. 
Cancer presents some unique causation problems. One commentator has explained 
the causation problem in this way: 
This proximate cause test is commonly needed in cases involving the mis- 
diagnosis of cancer. A physician may negligently miss the diagnosis. By the 
time the cancer is picked up three or four months later it has spread, and the 
patient's life expectancy is poor. To state that the delay of several months in 
diagnosis and treatment was the certain or even probable cause of the spread is 
impossible. One can claim, however, that the delay harmed the patient by re- 
ducing his chances for a cure, which may provide a winning argument. 
R. GOTS, THE TRUTH ABOUT MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 42 (1975). 
One commentator has suggested an alternative to the "proximate cause" method of 
analysis. Under the proposed "duty-risk" analysis, the causation problems present under 
the proximate cause analysis could be avoided. The plaintiff would be required to show a 
factual connection or conduct that connects the defendant to the plaintiffs injury in 
some way distinct from the rest of the world. Factual connection does not denote fault or 
liability. Factual connection in the Truman case can be shown by evidence that Dr. 
Thomas was the only physician treating Mrs. Truman during the period in question. The 
analysis would then proceed much the same way as in proximate cause analy- 
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Eventually the question of physician liability under in- 
formed refusal is reduced to a policy decision: Should this duty 
to inform be imposed on the medical profession, and if so, under 
what circumstances? Before adopting a new duty or tort liabil- 
ity, the need for the liability should be balanced against the bur- 
den the duty imposes upon the physi~ian .~~ The following fac- 
tors should be considered: (1) whether the quality of medical 
care will be improved; (2) what the resulting costs and benefits 
to the patient and the physician are; and (3) the extent to which 
the new doctrine wi l l  be extended to other professions. 
Unless the duty to inform patients of the risks of refusing 
tests or treatment would significantly improve the quality of 
medical care, the patient would not benefit from imposing the 
new duty upon the physician because the patients would bear 
the increased cost of medical services. In addition, if the duty to 
inform could not satisfactorily be shifted to medical support 
staff, the time required for a physician to educate patients would 
detract from his primary obligation to treat patients and would 
also clog the access of other patients to medical services. On the 
other hand, if patients in fact are refusing diagnostic tests and 
treatment because they are unaware of their underlying pur- 
poses, then the quality of medical care would be improved by 
requiring physicians to make this information available to them. 
Failure to do so should result in physician liability. 
Whenever a new duty is to be imposed in negligence liabil- 
ity, its potential impact on other professions should be analyzed. 
Traditionally, the doctrine of informed consent only allowed re- 
covery in medical malpractice cases where there was an intru- 
sion to the body autonomy.4a However, liability for informed re- 
fusal could arguably be imposed whenever a patient refuses to 
follow a physician's advice. This raises troubling questions, not 
only for the medical profession, but also for other professions to 
which similar malpractice liability might be extended. For in- 
stance, could dentists who fail to inform patients of the risks 
sis--determining a duty owing to the plaint8 and a breach of that duty. The duty-risk 
analysis only tries to eliminate the strained finding of molecular or proximate causation. 
See Thode, supra note 35; Thode, supra note 39. 
41. 27 Cal. 3d at 298,611 P.2d at 909, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 315 (Clark, J., dissenting); 
Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144,153,577 P.2d 669,674,145 Cal. Rptr. 534, 538 
(1978); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108,113,443 P.2d 561,564,70 Cal. Rptr. 97,100 
(1968). 
42. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 
1064 (1972); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960). 
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associated with not brushing their teeth or not having regular 
checkups be held liable for the consequences of dental disease. 
Similarly, informed refusal liability could adversely affect attor- 
neys who fail to adequately inform clients of the legal reasons 
behind their advice and the legal ramifications of refusing to fol- 
low that advice. Clearly, the extension of such a duty to other 
professions would inflict them with the same onerous and costly 
burden. However, once the duty to obtain an informed refusal is 
imposed on physicians, it would inevitably be extended to den- 
tists, lawyers and other professionals. 
These policy considerations make clear that an expanded 
duty for physicians under a doctrine of informed refusal should 
be limited and clearly defined. The physicians should be able to 
determine when the duty has been met; those attempting to im- 
pose liability should know what constitutes a breach of that 
duty. A major criticism of the informed consent doctrine is that 
it has failed to establish workable guidelines for physicians. Doc- 
tors generally have been unable to ascertain to what extent they 
are required to educate their patients of the risks of proposed 
treatment.4s 
Courts, however, frequently refrain from establishing guide- 
lines, reasoning that to do so would infringe on legislative func- 
tions." Nonetheless, if courts elect to create new duties, they 
43. One commentator has expresed this criticism of the informed consent doctrine: 
The application of the existing informed consent doctrine to the day-to- 
day practice of medicine is fraught with inconsistency. Legal requirements im- 
posed on the physician are ill-defined and diffuse . . . . The result has been a 
litany of lawsuits by outraged patients, creating uncertainty and confusion 
within the medical community. 
Clearly, the existing doctrine of informed consent must undergo major re- 
consideration by state legislatures and the legal community if it is to: (1) guar- 
antee a meaningful choice to the medical consumer; (2) lend substance to the 
medical consumer's heretofore illusory right to self-determination; (3) afford 
substantial certitude to the medical community; and (4) encourage judicial 
consistency. 
Maldonado, Strict Liability and Informed Consent: "Don't Say I Didn't Tell You So!", 
9 AKRON L. REV. 609, 609-10 (1976). 
In a study published by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the Sec- 
retary's Commission on Medical Malpractice found that "[tlhe doctrine of informed con- 
sent is subject to abuse when it imposes an unreasonable responsibility upon the physi- 
cian." U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, REPORT ON THE SECRETARY'S 
COMMISSION ON  MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 29 (1973). 
See also Mills, Whither Informed Consent?, 229 J.A.M.A. 305 (1974). 
44. Some states have passed laws outlining a physician's duty to inform the patient 
of inherent risks of treatment prior to obtaining consent to treatment. See, eg., IOWA 
CODE ANN. 5 147.137 (West Supp. 1980); GA. CODE ANN. $9 88-2901 to -2907 (1979). 
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should do so with certainty. 
Several factors need to be considered in setting the scope of 
a new duty of informed refusal. Liability more readily should be 
imposed when the patient has made an uninformed refusal of 
treatment as opposed to an uninformed refusal of a diagnostic 
test. In recommending a proposed course of treatment, the phy- 
sician is already aware of the medical problems, whereas in rec- 
ommending certain diagnostic tests the physician is merely fol- 
lowing accepted preventive measures. Diagnostic tests are the 
physician's tools of discovery. Many times the physician does 
not even suspect that there is a medical problem until the tests 
are made. In recommending treatment, however, the physician 
knows what the problem is and what the consequences most 
likely are if treatment is refused. 
Furthermore, certain diagnostic tests are recommended to 
all patients regardless of present or past ailments and are rou- 
tinely administered to patients as a class. These tests and their 
accompanying purposes are usually familiar to, and understood 
by, the majority of patients. Examples of these types of tests 
include blood pressure tests, blood tests, chest X-rays, breast ex- 
aminations, and Pap smear tests.46 Some are specific to the dis- 
ease they are designed to detect; others are general in nature 
and could detect any of a number of diseases.46 There are, how- 
ever, diagnostic tests that are unfamiliar to the average patient, 
and the physician should be required to provide additional in- 
California has no such statute. 
45. Because of the effective nationwide effort on the part of cancer prevention 
groups to encourage women to have Pap smear tests regularly, this test should be classi- 
fied in the group of familiar tats. A survey of cervical cancer rates found: "Almost all 
women regardless of age, ethnic group, or income had heard of the Pap smear test . . . ." 
Stern, Misczynski, Greenland, Damus & Coulaon, "Pap" Testing and Hysterectomy 
Prevalence: A Survey of Communities with High and Low Cervical Cancer Rates, 106 
AM. J .  EPIDEMIOLOGY 296,298 (1977). The survey also found that 86-90% of the women 
35-44 years old had had a Pap smear test within the last two years. Id. at 299. 
Also, a vast majority of women in this country understand that death can result 
when cancer is allowed to develop untreated. Id. The American Cancer Society has made 
a nationwide effort to educate people on cancer detection and prevention. Numerous 
pamphlets distributed by the American Cancer Society encourage people to have routine 
checkups for cancer and to see a physician at  the earliest sign of cancer. See, e.g., AMERI- 
CAN CANCER SOCIETY, INC., FACTS ON UTERINE CANCER (1978); AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, 
INC., WHY CHECKUPS SHOULD BE A PART OF EVERY WOMAN'S LIFE, ALL HER LIFE. . . 
(1978); AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, INC., CANCER FACTS FOR WOMEN (1977); AMERICAN 
CANCER SOCIETY, INC., STAY HEALTHY, LEARN ABOUT UTERINE CANCER (1973). 
46. A simple blood test, for example, could detect diabetes, anemia, cancer, and nu- 
merous other serious and often fatal diseases. It could also detect common and easily 
treatable diseases as well as the presence of infection. 
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formation to the patient who refuses such a test. 
Although it has been argued that the scope of a physician's 
duty under informed refusal should not be very broad, there are 
concededly certain limited circumstances in which a physician 
who fails to adequately inform the patient of the risks inherent 
in refusing recommended treatment or tests should be held lia- 
ble. Such liability could justifiably be imposed on a physician in 
the following circumstances: First, the physician recommends 
medical treatment for a specific complaint but fails to inform 
the patient of the risks and consequences of refusing treatment. 
The patient refuses the treatment, and injury results from the 
development of an undisclosed risk. Secondly, the patient specif- 
ically requests to be informed of the risks inherent in not under- 
going the proposed treatment or diagnostic test, but the physi- 
cian fails to adequately inform the patient, and injury results 
from the development of an undisclosed risk. Finally, the physi- 
cian recommends a diagnostic test not understood by a reason- 
able patient and also fails to inform the patient of the risks in 
refusing the test, and injury results from the development of an 
undisclosed riske4' 
The first circumstance does not apply to the Truman case 
because Dr. Thomas was not treating Mrs. Truman for syrnp- 
toms related to the cervical cancer. Because Mrs. Truman re- 
fused the Pap smear test and did not request information re- 
garding it, the second circumstance is also inapplicable. Finally, 
a Pap smear test is understood by women to detect cervical can- 
cer, and women understand that cancer can cause death; accord- 
ingly, the third circumstance does not apply. Therefore, had the 
Supreme Court of California decided the Truman case under 
this approach, based on a reasonable and justifiable duty of in- 
formed refusal, it would have found Dr. Thomas not negligent in 
failing to inform Mrs. Truman that death could result from al- 
lowing cancer to develop undetected when she refused the rec- 
ommended Pap smear test. 
Truman u. Thomas represents an unwarranted expansion of 
the doctrine of informed consent to include liability for a physi- 
cian's failure to disclose the risks of refusing to submit to a rou- 
tine diagnostic test. Liability for failure to inform patients who 
47. In all circumstances the physician is only required to disclose those risks that 
would have been known to the reasonable physician. Expert testimony would be allowed 
to show what risks were ,known or should have been known to the physician. 
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refuse tests or treatment may be justifiable if the claim were 
brought in the traditional negligence format. However, to pro- 
vide justice to both patient and physician the scope of this new 
duty should be strictly limited. In the instant case the liability 
imposed on Dr. Thomas was beyond the reasonable scope of a 
physician's duty. 
Carol A. Cluff 
